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Both economic theory and casual empirical observation of the U.S.
econonly suggest that spending propensities from temporary tax
changes are smaller than those from permanent ones, but neither
provides much guidance about the magnitude of this difference.
l'his paper offers new empirical estimates of this difference and
findsitto he quite substantial. The analysis is based on an amend-
ment of the standard distributed lag version of the permanent in-
conic hypothesis that distinguishes temporary taxes froni other in-
come on the grounds that the former are "more transitory." This
amendment, which is broadly consistent with rational expectations.
leads to a nomilinear consumption function. Though the standard
error is unavoidably large, the point estimate suggests that a tempo-
rary tax change is treated as a 50-50 blend of a normal income tax
change and a pure windfall. Over a 1-year planning horizon, a
temporary tax change is estimated to have only a little more than half
the impact of a permanent tax change of equal magnitude, and a
rebate is estimated to have only about 38 percent of the impact.
In 1968, faced with a classic case of demand inflation, Congress
enacted a temporary increase in personal income tax payments to
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curb aggregate demand. In 1975, near the trough ofour worst post-
war recession, Congress enacted a tax rebate and othertemporary decreases in taxes and increases in transferpayments designed to
stimulate aggregate demand. Questions have been raised about the
effectiveness of both measures.
The questions have both theoretical and empiricalrools. On
theoretical grounds, the permanent income—life cyclehypothesis
seems to argue that temporary income tax changes should have little
effect on consumer spending in principle. On empiricalgrounds, data
on consumer behavior seem to suggest that the impacts of the two
temporary taxes on spending were also small in practice. In 1968, the
savings rate fell from 7.5 percent in the quarter immediately preced-
ing the tax surcharge (1968:2) to only 5.6 percent in the firstquarter of the surtax, suggesting that consumers keptspending despite the
tax. In 1975, the savings rate ballooned from 6.4percent just prior to the rebate to a stunning 9.7 percent in thequarter of the rebate
(1975:2), suggesting that little of the rebate wasspent.
The purpose of this paper is to study these twotemporary tax
changes in some detail. Precisely what prediction does economic
theory make about the relative effectiveness of temporary versus
permanent tax changes? And what conclusions can be reached from
U.S. time-series data? The fact that the Carter administration asked
for (hut did not get) a repeat performance of the rebate in1977
suggests that there is more than academic interest in the answers to
these questions.
Section 1 outlines the theoretical issues, beginning withan idealized
life-cycle model and proceeding to introduce some important "real
world" considerations. Since the discussion showsquite clearly that
the issue is an empirical one, Section II reviewsprevious empirical
work on the subject very briefly. Section III explains theunderlying basis of the empirical model of thispaper, relating it to recent litera-
ture on rational expectations and the permanent income hypothesis
(PIH), and then Sections IV and V show how this basicconceptual framework was converted into art operationalempirical model. The
estimates are presented and analyzed in Section VI, and SectionVII
summarizes the main conclusions.
I. The Implications of Theory: Pure andImpure
I. The Pure Permanent Income—L[e Cycle
Theoiy
As Eisner (1969) pointed out some timeago, the PIH casts doubt on
the effCctivéness of income tax changes thatare labeled as temporary
because such measures have only minor effectson permanent income.28 JOURNALOF POLITICAL ECONOMY
To develop a theoretical benchmark for the marginal propen-
sity to consume (MPG) that the PIH suggests might apply to a tempo-
rary tax, consider a rarefied world in which consumers with exoge-
nous earnings streams select consumption paths to maximize lifetime
utility. If capital markets are perfect, only the discounted present
values of the earnings streams matter, so suppose all households earn
a constant income y per year. Assume further that households differ
only in age, a; that the real rate of interest is zero; and that the
subjective rate of time discounting is also zero.' The question is, If
income taxes are raised by zpercapita for the period from I =0to I =
t,,how much less will consumers spend over this interval?
In answering this question, there are three population groups to
keep track of. People who are "alive" (in the economic sense) at I =0
and who live past the expiration of the tax suffer an income loss of t1z
over the period. If T denotes the length of life, then each such person
ofagea consumes a fraction i11(T— a)of this loss during the years in
which the temporary tax is in effect. Thus the change in consumption
per capita is C1 =zt/(T
—a).
Old people who are alive at! =0,but die before! =I,,lose only (T
—a)zin income. However, since they have MPCs of unity during the
surtax period as a whole, their change in consumption per capita is
C2 =(T
—a)z.
Finally,we must worry about people who are born between I =0
and I =I,.Ii a, a negative number between 0 and —I,, denotes the age
of such a person, and he lives for 1, + a <1, years during the period 0
i,, his income loss is (I, + a)z. Since he spends a fraction (I +
a)/T of this income during the period 0tI, the change in his
consumption is C3 =z(t,+ a)2]/T.
To derive the aggregate change in per capita consumption, weight
these groups by the age distribution, considering the ages —l a
T. In the simplest case of a uniform age distribution, [(a) =lIT,the
change is
rT—ti tT
=J da +J —da +J da.
o T r—t1I' —t,I'
Working out the integrals and dividing by the total income that is
taxed away during the period (I,z per capita), we obtain
T (T—11)2 1I
MPC=-7-(logT—logI,)+ 1 —-—+ 2Ti,
where the three terms show the contributions of the three different
population groups.
IThisisessentiallythemodel introduced by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954).TEMPORARY INCOME TAXES 29
To take a concrete example, suppose the typical lifetime ofa
household head as a household head is T =50 years.Then, according
to this formula, the MPG for a 1-year tax (t =1)is .09, while that for a
2-year tax (t =2)is .15.2 The MPG =.09for a 1-year temporary tax is
only a rough benchmark representing the pure PIH, and there are a
number of reasons why the theory probably systematically under-
states the responses of consumers to temporary taxes (see below), so
we should not take this number too seriously. Still, there are two
lessons worth drawing from this simple exercise—lessons that have
often been forgotten in the temporary-tax debate.
a) Income gains and losses from temporary taxes will eventually be
spent just like any other increment or decrement to lifetime re-
sources: if less is spent at first (because t1 < T), then more will bespent later. Thus if we want to inquire- about the "effectiveness" oftempo-
rary taxes, we must specify a time horizon. Over a long enough run,
they must be just as "effective" as permanent ones.
b) The so-called zero effect view—that constimers ignore the surtax
and consume as if it never happened—does notrepresent the PIH at
all. Instead, that theory says that consumers should spendprecisely
what they would on receipt of a windfall gain (or loss) of11z.Inthe
illustrative calculation, this turns out to be the "9percent effect" view.
2.- Caveats and Imperfictions
There are several reasons why surtaxes may affect spending more
strongly than indicated by pure theory. First, tax-induced income
changes that are not consumed must be saved, If windfall gains are
used to purchase durable goods, consumer spendingmay rise much
more strongly than consumption; the converse may happen when
there are windfall losses. The magnitude of the marginalpropensity
to spend windfalls on durable goods is, of course, an empiricalques- tion .
Second,some households may be subject to liquidity constraints
that are usually ignored by the PIH. If we stay within thecertainty
context, these constrained households will react strongly to even tem-
porary income changes.4 Thus the aggregate MPG for a temporary
tax is a weighted average of the low MPGs of unconstrained house-
holds and the high MPGs of constrained ones. Again, the importance
of this phenomenon is an empirical question.
2 By way of comparison, as i1', theMPG5/6.
See, e.g., Darby(1972).
See Blinder (1976) and Dolde (1978). For alookat oneparticular type of uncer—
tarrity,see FoleyaridHellwig (1975), which showsthat this result may not carry through
tothe uncertainty case.() JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
Third, as Okun (1971) pointed out, consumer behavior depends on
what people believe rather than on what the government announces.
If consumers disbelieve the government when it tells them that a tax
hike is only temporary, then the spending response will begreater
than that suggested by a naive application of the PIH.5 Since the
perceived duration of the surtax, not the declared duration, is rele-
ant from the standpoint of the PIH, this too raises an empirical issue.
Finally, we must recognize the possibility that households may not
do the kind of rational long—term planning envisioned by Modigliani
and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman (1957) or, what amounts to the
same thing, have very high subjective discount rates. If they are very
shortsighted, then temporary fluctuations in disposable income may
have substantial effects on spending.
II. previous Empirical Work
Okun's (1971) study opened the empirical debate on this issue. Using
the consumption equations of four econometric models, he compared
the "full effect" view that the 1968 surtax was just as effective as a
permanent tax increase to the "zero effect" view that consumers totally
ignored the surtax. While he concluded that the full effect view fit the
data better, an intermediate "50 percent effect" view actually does
better than either extreme.6 Springer (1975) criticized Okun's
econometric procedures and then performed a similar experiment
with a consumption function based on the PIH. He concluded that
the zero effect view perfornied better.
juster (1977), using a series of savings equations based on the
Hoitthakker-Talor (1966) model, reached conclusions about the
1975 rebate similar to those of Okitn for the 1968 surtax. But Modig-
liani and Steindel (1977) found that the rebate hadvery little impact
over a horizon of 1 or 2 quarters. Their modified version of the
life—cycle niodel implied, however, a virtually full effect view over a
6-quarter horizon. Modigliani and Steindel assumed that the nonre-
hate portions of the 1975 tax cuts were treated likepermanent taxes
and handled the 1968 surtax with dummy variables.
The existing empirical literature thus offers little consensus. The
issue seems quite open.
III. The Distributed Lag Model of Consumption
The basic vehicle for investigating the effectiveness oftemporary
income taxes in this paper is the distributed lag version of the PIH.
This point has rather less cogency with respect to tax cuts; but here tOo Consumers
may believe t hen to he morepermanentthan the government annonnces.
On this, see Blinder and Solow (1974, pp. 1 07—9).TEMPORARY INCOME TAXES
While this is the standard way of implementing the PIH empirically,
the recent literature on rational expectations has seemed to raise
doubts about its validity.7 This section shows how the PLH and
rational expectations together lead to an estimating equationvery much like the one I use in this paper.
As Muth (1960) pointed out, the P1 H is basically a !flOtt1(1-looking
modelof consumer behavior. It states that consumers, in deciding on
their current spending, weigh their current asset holdings, their cur-
rent income from labor, and their expected future income from
labor. Specifically, permanent income at time I is defined as
Y =A,+\
z (1 +r)
whereA, is the stock of real assets at the beginning of period 1,}', is
noninterest income in period 1, and is the mathematical (i.e.,
rational) expectation ofthat is formed at time 1.(Byconvention, =Y,.)However, if the stochastic process generating income can be
described by a time-series model such as
=aY,_1 + aJ,_2 +. . . + a1}',__+ €,,
where€,isa white noise error term, then the resulting empirical
modelofconsumption will be bakward looking. For example, if the
theoretical consumption function is
C,= + kY + u,,
thenthe empirical consumption function will be
C,=+kA,+b,,Y,+h1}',.,+ ... + b,,}',_,,+u,.
To see this, it is only necessary to note that the (rational) expecta—
ti()n of income in period I+s can, in view of (2), be based only on the
information set {Y,, Y,_,, Y, }.Thus,for example,
(ljY, + 2 )',_ I + (i '(--2 +. + 0n+ I
= a11Y,,1+a2),+a;,Y,_1+. + ('+iil--fl-f I,
= (a +°2)}',+ (0102+a3)Y,_1 + .
andso on. Substituting all such expressions into the definition (1) and
theii into the consumption function (3), it is clear that (4) is (lerived.
As pointed out by Sargent (1978) and others, the coefficients b, in
equation (4) will be complicated functions of the coefficients a in (2).
Suppose then that, as suggested by Dolde (1976), we can clistiiiguish
among two or more sources of' income whosegenerating fuiictions (2)
may differ. The PIH in conjunction with rational expectations then
See1,iicas (1976) and esp.Hall (I 97M).32 JOURNAl.OF PoliTiCAl.ECONOMY
implies thattheh's in (4) should follow a different pattern for each
income source. Asimpleexamplewillillustrate this point and also
give us somefeelingfor possible magnitudes. Consider several in-
come sources, each of which is generatedbya first-order autoregres-
sive:
=p1Y1,1_1+ €. (5)
Working out the expectations and plugging into (1) gives us a simple
expression for the permanent income attributable to each source:
=I+ r
Y0,if p < 1 + r. (6) 1 + r —
Noticethat, despite the long time horizon contemplated by the PIH,
consumption depends only on current income. In general, consump-
tion will depend on past income only up to lag n, where ii + 1 is the
longest lag considered in equation (2).
Now compare two income sources, one of which is entirelyperma- nent (p =1)and the other of which is entirely transitory (p =0).A
$1.00 increase in the permanent component will, according to (6),
raise permanent income by $(l + r)Irandthus raise consumption by
$k(1 + r)/r. This may imply a very large immediate spending re-
sponse.8 By contrast, a $1.00 fluctuation in the purely transitory
component will, again according to (6), raise permanent income by
only $1.00 and thus raise consumption by only $k. The lesson, of
course, generalizes and applies far beyond the confines of first-order
autoregressives: income sources deemed to be more permanent will elicit
prompter spending responses than income sources deemed to be more temporary.
The application of this principle to permanent versustemporary
changes in taxes is apparent and immediate and was elucidated clearly
by Lucas (1976). It is the basic notion underlying the empirical model
to be developed in the next section.
However, lest confusion arise, I should stress that there is no sense
in which the rationality of expectations is either assumed or imposed
in the consumption functions estimated here. My point is only that the
distributed lag formulation of the PIH is consistent with rational
expectations. As Sargent (1978) has emphasized, rational expectations
delivers a set of restrictions across equations (2) and (4) that can be
imposed in estimating the two jointly. I have made no attempt to
impose these restrictions here because my interest was in getting the
best possible consumption-function estimates, not intesting
rationality. Furthermore, it is well known that quite different models
8 Suppose the rate of subjecttve time discounting is equal to therate of interest, so
that a constant consumption stream is optimal, and that B is the lifetime propensity to
consume (i.e., —B isthe propensity to bequeath). Then kwillbeBr/(1 + r),sothatk(1 + r)/rwillbe B,whichis close to unity.TEMPORARY INCOME TAXES 33
ofconsumption behavior(e.g., habit persistence) canlead to an es—
tinlatiligequation ver',much like (4). It is notmypurpose to discrimi-
nateamong alternative ways ofarrivingat (4).
IV.Derivation of an Estimating Equation
The preceding discussion makes it clear that different distributed lag
coefficients might be associated with different sources of income.
While the actual empirical analysis considered four types of income,
the model is most readily explained if I suppose there are only two:
income (positive or negative) attributable to temporary tax measures,
which I denote as. S(special income"); and all other disposable
income ("regular income"), which I denote asR,. TheR, should not be
confused with permanent income, since it has both permanent and
transitory components. The basic idea underlying the estimating
equation is that S1 is identifiably "less permanent" than R1.
Suppose consumption responds to R1 according to a set of distrib-
uted lag weights: w =ôC,I&R1_,j=0,1 n. Since the w) depend
on the stochastic process generating R1, it is worth reporting that the
deviations of R1 from a logarithmic time trend are well described by
the following second-order autoregressive :9
y, = '35Yt-2,R2 =.91,D-W =1.86.
(.09) (.09)
When income follows a second-order autoregressive, permanent in-
come as defined in (1) is:
(1+r)2
(1 +r)(1+r—a1)
—a2
a2(1 +r) + )t—I (1 +r)(1 +r—a1)—a2
if a1 +a2/(1+r)<1+r,where K1 is the present value of the trend
component of labor income and yt and Yt-i are current and lagged
deviations from trend. Given the estimates of a1 and a2 above, and for r =.0074(a 3 percent annual real interest rate), the implied
coefficients are Y =-A1 +K+IS.5y — 4•7Yt—i.This leads us to expect
a very large value of w0, followed by swiftly declining w's—possibly
even turning negative. The empirical results bear this out.
As Lucas (1976) has argued, income changes that are clearly "more
temporary" than regular income should get different spending
Standard errors are in parentheses. Longer autoregressives, however, give slightly
better fits. E.g., if t —11is the longest lag allowed to enter the regression, significant
coefficients are obtained at lags 1, 2, 3, 4,and11. An F-test for the zero restrictions
implied by the second-order model, however, yields an F-ratio of only 1.77, which is
well below the critical 5 percent point of the xi distribution.34 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
coefficients. To develop a model of the distributed lag response of C
to S,, first break down S into its components:
S/ =S+ S + .. +S, (7)
where S indicates the income gain or loss in quarter I from the ith
temporary tax. (In the empirical work, m =3.)It will help clarify the
treatment of the S if I define a hypothetical set of lag coefficients f3 as
the effect on G of a $1.00 pure windfall gain received in quarter 1—j.
Thetreatment of S depends on whether or not the ith temporary
tax is still in effect. If it is, 1 assume that S is treated as a weighted
average of regular and windfall income, so that it gets the distributed
lag weights
=_____ = Xzo+ (1 —X)f3,j= 0,1 n (8) 0x1.
If the temporary tax is no longer on the books, I assume that consum-
ers look upon S_ in retrospect as if it had been a pure windfall and so
apply the distributed lag coefficients .Byintroducing a dummy
variable defined as:
=1if the ith temporary tax remains in firce in quarter 1,
= 0otherwise,
it is possible to combine these two hypotheses into a single expression:
=DXw +(1 —X)i3j+ (1 D)$, (9)
where the notation now indicates that the y weights depend both on
calendar time and on the specific tax under consideration (because of
the dummy variable).
An interesting point arises here. Standard pre-rational-expec-
tations approaches to consumption—function estimation would sug-
gest that and1y3 be constrained to equal apparently
meaning that the "long—run MPC' out of any type of income is
identical. However, the PIH-cum -rational-expectations approach
suggests no such adding-up constraint. To see this, follow Sargent
(1978, pp• 681—82) in rewriting (2) in the form X,= HX1_1+ m
(Sargent'seq. 8), where
'2
10 00 0
01 .
X1 H=
: ::
0•
00 10 0TEMPORARY INCOME TAXES 35
and Y, =dX,,where d =(1,0, .. . , 0).As Sargent notes (his eq. 9),
rational expectations implies ,X, =HX,,whence ,Y,+. =dHX,.
Substituting this into (1) gives the following expression for permanent
income:
Y =A1 + {
]xt,
whichis of the form (4) with coefficients
dHs b(b0,b1,. .. ,bn)=>.,(1+r)
The sum of the b has no obvious interpretation. Thus, in a model
with several sources of income, there is no particular reason why the
various sets of distributed lag coefficients should have a common sum.
Where, then, does the lifetime budget constraint enter? The answer
is that (4) implies a unitary lifetime MPG for any values of k and the b,.
The proof involves some straightforward but tedious algebraic ma-
nipulations of the difference equations (4) and
A,1 =(1+ r)A1 + Y1 —C1 (10)
and hence is relegated to Appendix A.
With these preliminaries out of the way, it is easy to explain the
estimating equation. If there were no special taxes to worry about, the
basic empirical model of consumer behavior would be as follows:
C1 =k0+ k1r1Y, +
j=o
'1 (11)
+ k2(W, —A1)+ + U,,
wherer, is the rate of interest, W, is consumer net worth at the
beginning of period t,andA, is the market value of stock market
wealth at the beginning of period t.Thespecific way in which assets
are entered into the consumption function, including the constraint
that k3 + k4 + .. +=k2,is suggested by the MIT-Penn-SSRG
(MPS) model and is unimportant to what follows.
Now consider the separation of disposable income into its two
components:
Y,=R,+S,. (12)
The way I have defined the y's means that (11) is expanded to:
C, =k0+ k1r,Y, + k2(W, —A,)+36 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
+ + yJ(t)S_ (13)
+ +U1.
Substituting (9) and (12) into (13), and rearranging terms, gives:
C1 =k0+ k1r1Y1 + k2(W1 —A1)+
+ + AX —S1_) (14)
+i[(1 —A)X+(1 _D)S]+ui
where X + .. . +D7S"'_,,j=0 ii. This is not the actual
estimating equation because additional income sources were distin-
guished, because the distributed lag coefficients were constrained in
several ways, and because corrections were made for both hetero-
scedasticity and serial correlation in the error term. Details are spelled
out in Appendix B. Nonetheless (14) is the most useful form for
interpreting the estimated parameters. The model is nonlinear be-
cause of the parameter it—the crucial parameter of this study.
As noted above, theory does not imply that Lw3 =If3. Toinvesti-
gate this further, this adding-up constraint was imposed in (14) and its
validity tested as follows.'0 Let 1' denote the likelihood ratio. Then,
under the assumption of normality, —2 logTlog (SSRr/SSR) is
distributed as a x2 with r degrees of freedom, where: T =numberof
observations (= 100 throughout this paper), SSR = minimized value
of the sum of squared residuals in the unconstrained regression (eq.
{14J in this case), SSRr = minimized value of the sum of squared
residuals in the constrained regression (obtained by imposing 1f3 =
Lw), and r = number of restrictions (= 1 in this case). As reported in
table 1, row 1, the constraint was rejected at the 10 percent level but
not at the 5 percent level. There being no persuasive theoretical
rationale for it, the constraint was dropped.
Tacitly, however, (14) embodies a number of other constraints that
are equally lacking in theoretical justification—constraints that each
type of regular income is subject to the same set of distributed lag
coefficients. These constraints were tested by a series of likelihood
ratio tests, which are described in the balance of this section.
'°See Goldfeldand Quandt (1972, p. 74).TEMPORARY INCOME TAXES 37
TABLE 1
A2TESTS OF CONSTRAINTS
Unconstrained Constraint Test Model Tested df Statistic
1. Eq. (14) 1 3.67
2. Eq. (16) U= w forall) 3 12.02 3.Eq.(16) = I Approximately 0* 4.Eq. (18) with It' =1w Ct=wj forallj 3 19.02 5. Eq. (18) with lv =1wI4 Iw 1 12.52 6. Eq. (18) with lv =IwA 0 1 1.32 7. Eq. (18) with lv =Iw A =1 1 2.84 8. Eq. (18) with lv =1w k2 =0 1 17.81
NOTE—Criticallevels for the ' distribution are
dl I O4 Point 55 Point I S Point
2.71 3.84 6.63
3 6.25 7.8! 11.34
*1)00torounding error, the actual computed test statistic was slightly negative. When this constraint was tested in
the context ol eq. (18). ii produced a test statistic ol 1.32.
First,"regular" disposable income was disaggregated into its two
main components—personal income and "regular"personal taxes:
R,=P,—T." (15)
Personal income is assumed to bespent according to the lagweights
W, while regular taxes are assumed to be subject to a different set of
lag weights v. Special taxes are treated as previously explained,ex-
cept that the v's replace the w's in equations (8) and (9). That is, while
the tax is on the books, a special tax is treated asa weighted average of
a permanent tax and a windfall. Thus the basic consumption function
becomes:
=k0 + ktr,Y, + k2(W,—A,)+
+ wjP,_, —v(T,_
—AX) (16)
+ —A)X + (1
—
DDSJJ
+
Since(as explained below) the distributed lag coefficients are con-
strained to follow a third-degree polynomial witha zero end-point
It1 making this separation, I departed a bit from national incomeaccounting wnventions by including the employer's share of social insurance contributions in both P and T.38 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
constraint, the null hypothesis that the v are equal to the w imposes
three constraints on equation (16). Row 2 Of table 1 shows that these
constraints were resoundingly rejected by the data (x =12).How-
ever, it turned out that the stint of the v was estimated to be almost
exactly equal to the sum of the w (see row 3 of table 1), 50 this
adding-up constraint was imposed in subsequent estimates.
The final generalization considered was to disaggregate personal
income into its two main components—factor income and transfer
payments:'2
P1=F,+V1. (17)
This made the estimating equation:
=k0+ k,r1Y, + k2(W, —A1)+
+ + —v(T1_
—XX) (18)
+ -A)X+-
D)Si]+u.
Once again, the null hypothesis that the 4(spendingcoefficients for
transfers) are in fact equal to the w (spending coefficients for factor
income) was tested by a x2 test. And once again it was resoundingly
rejected (x =19;see row 4 of table 1). This time, however, the data
also rejected the adding-up constraint I4= Iw,which therefore was
not imposed (table I, row 5). In fact, most of the difference between
the 4andthe w was in their sums; the time patterns were remarkably
siniilar.
To summarize these tests, we are left with a model that assigns
distributed lag weights w to factor income, 4totransfers, v to
regular taxes, and to windfalls. The Iv and Iu' are apparently
equal, but the other sums are not.
V. Issues in Estimation
1. Data
Following the suggestion of Darby (1975), I used consumer ex-
penditures, rather than pure consumption, as C1. This seems most
appropriate where the focus is on the evaluation of stabilization poi-
icy, as it is here, rather than Ofl testing the PIH. Furthermore, it
12Forthis purpose,bothemployercontributions and business transfers are con-
sidered to be factor income, and the aspects of the 1975—76 tax cuts that are classified as
transfer payments in the nationalincomeaccoums are grouped with temporary taxes.TEMPORARY INCOME TAXES
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TABLE?
EFFEC1-5ON DISPOSABLE INCOME OF 1975—76
-TAX CursANDTRANSFERS*
1AXESI' TRANSFERS
Earned QUARtERTaxRate Cuts Rebate Social Secunty Income TOTAL
1975:2 8.5 31.2 6.7 0 46.4 1975:3 12.3 0 0 0 12.3 1975:4 11.9 0 0 0 11.9 1976:1 14.2 0 0 1.9 16.1 1976:2 14.0 0 0 1.6 15.6
*In bilious of current dollars, at annual rates.
From U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (February 1976, March 1977).
Kindly supplied to the author by Joseph C. Wakefield, of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, inconversation
avoidsmany complicated issues of definition (e.g., Which goods are
durables? How fast do they depreciate?etc., etc.). The cost of this
shortcut is that the theoretical interpretation ofsome of the param-
eters is lost. For example, kincludesthe effects of r1onboth pure
consumption (which may be positive or negative) andspending on durables (which should be negative).Similarly, the lag weights w
mightbe expected to be less smooth than thelag of pure consumption behind income because of the lumpy nature ofdurables.13
Data for the 1968 surcharge were taken from Okun(1971) and converted to 1972 dollars by the deflator forpersonal consumer
expenditures; these comprise Se'. Data for the various 1975—76tax
cuts are shown in table 2; they were similarly deflated andsegregated into two time series. The S? series is definedas the explicitly one-shot
measures: the tax rebates and the social security bonuses(hereafter
referred to as "the rebate"). The rest is consideredas S. Since the
1975 cuts were extended several times andare now a permanent
feature of the tax code, an arbitrary decision hadto be made as to
when they became "permanent."4 I decidedto cut off S after
1976:2, because by then the cuts had already been extendedonce in
the Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975 anda second time in the Tax
Reform Act of 1976.
To account for the special features of expenditureson consumer durables, several additional variables were tried in some earlierregressions. Neither the stock of dura- bles, nor the relative price of durables, nor theunemployment rate succeeded in
significantly lowering the sum of squared residuals, In severalcases, the signs of the coefficients were even the opposite of what theorysuggests. It may be that these variables are more relevant to the choice betweensaving in the form of durables vs. in financial form than they are to the choice betweenspending and saving. 14 At an early stage of this research, Iexperimented with a learning model in which a
temporary tax gradually came to be considered permanent as it remainedon the books longer and longer. This experiment was unsuccessful.40 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
Data on consumer net worth (W1), and its breakdown into stock
market (A1) and non—stock market (W1 —A1)components, were taken
from the data bank of the MPS model and converted to 1972 dollars.
They are based on a number of primary sources, the most important
of which is the flow of funds.
Because of the recent findings of Boskin (1978), I thought it im-
portant to use a real after-tax interest rate. Since the construction of
this series was a fairly involved affair, I explain it only in Appendix C.
2. Distributed Lag Estimation
The many distributed lags in equation (18) were estimated by an
adaptation of the Almon (1965) lag technique, as a method of con-
serving on parameters. Generally, a third-degree polynomial with a
zero constraint at the far end was used. Preliminary tests suggested
that these end-point constraints (w1 =0,etc.) could not be rejected.
An unconstrained version of one specification, run as an experiment,
showed that the polynomial constraint had very little effect on the w
coefficients but did influence the f3 coefficients.
The distributed lag effects of assets were estimated as follows. In
some preliminary regressions, the two components were combined
and a cubic distributed lag over it quarters was estimated. Then the
two components were disaggregated. These preliminary tests showed
quite clearly (a) that the coefficients were not the same and (b) that the
lag was much shorter than it quarters. (As explained just below, ii was
chosen to be 7.) In the case of non—stock market wealth, an estimated
distributed lag over 4 quarters attached virtually all of the weight to
the current (start of period) value, so all lagged values were omitted.
In the case of stock market wealth, when a cubic was estimated overj
=0,1 7, the coefficients turned out to be almost linear and to be
virtually zero afterj =2(a small positive value forj =3and small
negative values forj =4 7). Thus a linear distributed lag overj =
0 3 was adopted as the final specification.
The length of the distributed lag, it, was selected by running a
preliminary version of the regression for alternative values of it
ranging from 6 to 10. A very clear minimum in the sum of squared
residuals was found around n =7or it =8,with the former having a
slightly better fit and slightly better coefficients. On this basis, n =7
was selected for all subsequent work.
3. Treatment of the 1975 Rebate
As has been noted already, the model divides the 1975—76 tax cuts
into two parts: S includes the rebate, while S includes all the rest.TEMPORARY INCOME TAXES
This makes a strong (and questionable) assumption about how con-
sumers treated the rebate. In particular, it assumes that they treated it
just like the 1968 surcharge and the other 1975 reductions: essentially
as if a fraction A of it was a regular increase in income, while a fraction
I —Awas a pure windfall. Given the nature of the rebate, this is
questionable, to say the least.
An alternative assumption—equally strong as the first—.-is that con-
sumers treated the rebate as a pure windfall right from the start.'5
While it is not obvious that this is true, since consumers might have
anticipated a repeat performance with some reasonable probability,
it does seem a plausible working hypothesis. Fortunately, it is not
difficult to modify any of the three models to accommodate this
alternative hypothesis; all that is necessary is that the lag weights /3 be
applied to S starting immediately in 1975:2. When this was done in
one version of the model, the resulting equation had virtually an
identical SSR, almost the same estimated A, and very similar implica-
tions about spending patterns out of the rebate. Thus the conclusions
of this study seem insensitive to the treatment of the rebate.
VI. Empirical Results
1. Parameter Estimates and Interpretation
Estimation was done by the numerical optimization package devel-
oped by S. M. Goldfeld and R. E. Quandt. The results from estimat-
ing equation (18) on quarterly data covering 1953: 1—1977 :4 are
presented in table 3. The number in parentheses next to each esti-
mated coefficient is its asymptotic standard error (or rather a numeri-
cal estimate thereof).
In interpreting the standard error of the regression, it should be
mentioned that, as explained in Appendix B, the equation was ac-
tually transformed so that the left-hand variable was the average
propensity to consume (APC), CIY€,ratherthan consumer spending.
Thus, the standard error of .0038 is relative to a typical value for the
APC of about .90. This represents an excellent fit.'6 At 1977 income
levels, it translates to a standard error of about $3.5 billion in pre-
dicting consumer spending. Of course, obtaining a good fit with a
consumption function is hardly a notable achievement, and the
equation—like most consumption functions—does suffer from some
autocorrelation (p =.54).
°Sincethe rebate was off the books by 1975:3, and hence treated as a windfall in any
case, only 1975:2 is at issue here.
The standard errors of a comparable equation in Modigliani and Steindel (1977)
are .0056 with an autocorrelation correction and .0065 without.42 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
TABLE 3
NONI.INEARCoNsurslp'rloN FUNCTION PARAMETER ESTIMATES*
k k k2 A p
30.1
(7.1)
.0002 .021 .50
(.0007) (.005) (.32)
.54
(.11)
DISTRI BUTEI) LAGCOEFFICIENTSI-
j iv, v, k3 'y,Rebate
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
.60 (.05)
.16 (.02)
—.06 (.03)
—.12 (.02)
—.08(.01)
.02 (.01)
.10(.02)
.11 (.02)
.50(16).34 (.09)—.03 (.26).009 (.002)
—.02 (.09).14(04) —.03 (.11).006 (.001)
—.20 (.10).04 (.05)—.01 (.09).004 (.001)
—.14 (.08).01 (.05) .03 (.09).002 (.0005)
.04(.06).02 (.03) .08 (.07)...
.26(.07).05 (.03) .11 (.06)...
.39(09).08 (.04) .12 (.08)...
.34 (.08).07 (.04) .09 (.07)...
.16
.06
.02
.02
.05
.08
.10
.08
.16
—.03
—.01
.03
.08
.11
.12
.09
Sum .74 1.17 .74 .36 .021 (.005).55 .55
Norr.—k0 =constant, k,coellicient of interest rate, A, = coefficient of non—snwk market wealth, A = weight on
regular Income. p aunworrelation coefficient. Sum of squared residuals = .00147. SE .00383, SE of unadjusted
errors (without a correction fiw autocorrelanon) = .00455. N observations = 100.
* Asyniptotir SEs are in parentheses.
Components nay not add to totals due to rounding. - -
Turningto the coefficient estimates, the most critical parameter for
purposes of this study is A, the weight attached to regular income in
equation (8). The point estimate of .50 suggests that temporary taxes
that are still on the books are treated like 50-50 blends of windfalls
and regular taxes. However, the standard error is regrettably large;
there are, after all, pitifully few observations that can be used to
estimate A. The null hypotheses A =0or A =1can nonetheless be
tested by likelihood ratio tests. When these tests were run with equa-
tion (18) as the unconstrained regression (see table 1, rows 6 and 7),
the null hypothesis that A =0(temporary taxes are regarded as pure
windfalls) could not be rejected (x= 1.32).But the null hypothesis
that A =1(temporary taxes are regarded as regular income) could be
rejected if we were not too fussy about significance levels (x=2.84).
I turn next to the distributed lag coefficients of the various income
terms. The w's for factor income are very large and positive at first,
then turn small and negative, and finally become positive again at the
end. This general shape accords well with our expectations.17 The 4
coefficientsfor transfer payments follow a similar shape but are much
more erratic and less well pinned down econometrically. A notable
'Becauseof theestimatingform, it is unlikely that simultaneity has much to do with
the large estimate for w0.SeeAppendix B.TEMPORARY INCOME TAXES
feature is that their sum is nearly 1.2, indicating "overspending"
during the first 2 years after receipt of a transfer payment.
The v coefficients for regular taxes also exhibit a characteristic
U-shape, but in much more muted fashion. As compared with factor
income, spending in the first year after a regular tax cut is apparently
substantially less, after which it catches up. This was surprising at first,
since Dolde (1976) and Modigliani and Steindel (1977) had suggested
that regular tax changes are "more permanent" than regular in-
come.'8 However, it turns out that the following second-order all-
toregressives describe the deviations from trend of personal income
(P1) and regular taxes (T1):
P1 =l.32P1_,
—.38P1_2,
(.09) (.09)
T, =1.11T,_, —.21lt—2.
(.09) (.10)
Using the formulas derived earlier for permanent income, these
time-series models imply that "permanent personal income" and
"permanent taxes" are given byP' =14.9P1
—5.7P1_,and T' =9.3T1
—1.9T1_,,so that, contrary to Dolde and Modigliani and Steindel, we
should actually expect a stronger short-run response of consumption
to fluctuations in P1 than to fluctuations in T1, which is exactly what I
find.
The next column, the /3's, are in some sense out-of-sample ex-
trapolations since there are no "pure windfalls" recorded in the
data.'9 Their only use is to form the weighted average )tw + (1 —
whichis reported in the column marked "y,." These are the ex-
penditure coefficients for income from a temporary tax that remains
on the books for the entire 2-year horizon. To illustrate the opposite
extreme, the column marked "Rebate" shows the spending
coefficients for a temporary tax that lasts only 1 quarter. These two
columns differ in details but are quite similar. There is a moderate
spending response in the initial quarter, followed by very little
spending over the next 3 or 4 quarters. Most of the spending out of a
temporary tax cut, according to these estimates, comes 5 or more
quarters after the cut.
The coefficient of assets (.02) is comparable to what others have
estimated, though a bit on the low side. A likelihood ratio test of the
null hypothesis k2 =0(which, in this constrained form, also implies k3 'Butsee Dolde(1979),where the transitory nature of allegedly permanent tax
changes is stressed. 'Imade an attempt, in some early regressions, to treat the National Service Life
Insurance Dividends of 1950 in this way, but I was not successful.44 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
=. .. = = 0)produced a test statistic of 17.8, which is highly
significant at any reasonable significance level (table 1, row 8).
If we ignore the fact that income from property is included in the
measure of income, the parameter k2canbe given an interesting
theoretical interpretation. In the basic life-cycle model, the consumer
maximizes a utility function of the form
1 'C1 0kl+p) l—'
subject to a lifetime wealth constraint. It can be shown by straightfor-
ward computations that the optimal solution for initial consumption is
C0 =[(r — g)/(1+ r)]W,whereW is lifetime wealth and g is the optimal
growth rate of C,, defined asg =(l+ r)/(1 + p)]'— 1.This means
thatk2 corresponds to the theoretical coefficient (r —g)/(1 +r), which
for small values of r and p is approximately equal to r + (lTh)(p— r).
Thus for small values of r the estimated valuek2 =.02implies that the
subjective discount rate, p. is approximately .02 or around 2—3
percent per quarter for plausible values of &
One striking result, though it is peripheral to the subject of this
study, is the tiny coefficient of the real after-tax interest rate.2° This
finding turned up in every specification of the model, including
several alternative measures of the rate of interest. (Sometimes the
coefficient was trivially negative, sometimes trivially positive, but al-
ways trivial.) While it accords well both with my earlier work (Blinder
1975) and with the work of others, it stands in sharp contrast with
Boskin's (1978) recent finding of a strong positive interest elasticity of
saving.
2. Temporary versus Permanent Taxes
We can now address the principal issue of this study: How effective
are explicitly temporary income tax changes as compared to those
announced to be permanent? Table 4 contains the answers derived
from the model, using the parameter estimates presented in table 3to
make equation (4) operational and using an annual real interest rate
of 3 percent in updating wealth according to equation (10). Itcan be
seen from column 4 that a temporary tax is about one-half as effective
as a permanent tax in the first year, rising to about three-quarters as
effective in the second year. Spending out of a rebate is somewhat
slower than this. My estimated cumulative spending propensitiesout
20Thespecific coefficient in table 3 means that a 1 percentage point rise in rlowers
savings by about .02 of 1 percent of disposable income—a trivial amount.TEMPORARY INCOME TAXES 45
TABLE 4
RELATIVEEFFECTIVENESS OF TEMI'ORARY I AXES
CUMULATIVESPENDINGPROPENSITIES RArlos
(2)1(1) (3)1(1) Permanent 2-Year Rebate
j (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0 .34 .16 .16 .47 .47
1 .50 .23 .14 .46 .28
2 .55 .26 .16 .47 .29
3 .56 .30 .21 .54 .38
4 .59 .36 .30 .61 .51
5 .65 .46 .43 .71 .66
6 .73 .57 .56 .78 .77
7 .81 .65 .66 .80 .81
of a rebate are larger than those estimated by Modigliani and Steindel
(1977) for the first few quarters but smaller thereafter.
These findings carry two important messages to fiscal policy plan-
ners. First, and most obvious, is that temporary taxes are less powerful
devices for short-run stabilization purposes than are permanent ones.
Second, and perhaps almost as important, the short-run relative inef-
fectiveness of such taxes implies that the impact of these measures in
the second year is larger than might be expected. For example,
according to table 4, each $1.00 of permanent tax reduction adds
$0.25 to spending in the second year, while each $1.00 of a rebate
adds $0.45. If the need is for a truly short-run stimulus to aggregate
demand, this effect may also be unwanted.
Both of these points can be illustrated by examining what the
equations have to say about the 1975—76 episode. First, it is useful to
display the observed APCs for this period in table 5. There are two
obvious phenomena crying out for explanation in these data. First,
why did the APC drop so sharply in 1975:2? Second, why did it
thereafter begin a steady climb to what is a truly extraordinary level
by 1977:1? (The corresponding personal savings rate was only 4.2
TABLE 5
AVERAGEPROPENSITIES TO CONSUME, 1975—77
1975 1976 1977
First quarter .913 .914 .935
Second quarter .881 .918 .926
Third quarter .903 .922 .922
Fourth quarter .907 .926 .925
Soiacr.—U.S. Bureauof Fcc,nomic Analysis (various issues).46 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
TABLE 6
ESTIMAIIL) EFFECTS OF THE 1975—76 1EMPORARY
1'AxCursON CONSUMER ExpENDIruRES*
Qitarici- Estimated Spending Effect
1975:2 5.9
1975:3 1.6
1975:4 2.7
1976:1 4.8
1976:2 6.7
1976:3 6.7
1976:4 7.1
1977:1 6.6
1977:2 7.2
1977:3 7.5
1977:4 7.3
*In blIion of 1972 1lIkr*.
percent—thelowest figure that had then been recorded sincethe
Korean War.)
According to the estimates presented in thispaper, the temporary tax cuts of 1975—76 contributed to both phenomena.Using the
spending coefficients presemed in table 4, table 6 shows the estimated
direct (excluding multiplier) effects onconsumer spending of the tax
cuts of 1975:2 through 1976:2, inclusive.21 Itappears that (1) very
little of the rebate was spent in 1975:2, (2) rather littleof the disposa-
ble income attributable to thetemporary tax cut package was spent
during the remainder of 1975, and (3) morespending out of the
temporary tax cuts was done in 1976 and yet more in 1977. Both the
low APC of 1975:2 and the high APCs of late 1976and early 1977 are
tracked very well by the model. One observationwhich virtually
jumps from table 6 is how very small these estimated spending im-
pacts are relative to the size of the economy they weremeant to
stimulate (real GNP in the neighborhood of $1,250billion).
Finally, there is one more question. If, instead of the 1975:2—
1976:2 package of temporarymeasures, the government had cut
taxes "permanently" in 1975:2 and then restored thenito their origi-
nal level starting in 1976:3, how large a taxcut would have achieved
the same average effect onaggregate demand?22
Table 7 summarizes the model's answers to thisquestion for three
different choices of the horizon over which the"average effect on
aggregate demand" might be defined. The first column gives the
average (lirect impact on spending attributed by the model to the
21 The reader is reminded that only these 5quarters areconsideredtemporary cuts. 22 For this calculation I assume thatconsumers were successfully fooled into thinking that the 5—quarter tax cut would l)e permanent.TEMPORARY INCOME TAXES 47
TABLE7
EQUIVALENTPERMANENT TAXES*.i-
Horizon
Average Impact on
SpendingofActual
1975—76Cuts
Cumulative Revenue Loss over
5 Quarters of Permanent Tax Cut
withEqualAverage Impact on Spending
4 quarters 3.7 9.5
6 quarters 4.7 12.4
8 quarters 5.3 15.9
* Seetextfor deftnition.
In billions of 1972 dollars, at in nnal rates.
1975—76tax cuts. The next column shows how much total tax reve-
nue the government would have had to relinquish during the same
5-quarter period (1975 : 2—1976 :2) in order to achieve the same direct
impact on spending through a permanent tax cut. Since the total
5-quarter revenue loss from the 1975—76 package was $20 billion,
these numbers mean, for example, that a permanent tax cut about
half as large ($9.5 billion vs. $20 billion) would have had the same
first-year effect on aggregate demand. Over a 2-year horizon, how-
ever, the 1975—76 package had about 80 percent as much "bang for
the buck" as a permanent tax cut.
VII. Summary
Both economic theory and casual empirical observation of the U.S.
economy suggest that short-run spending propensities from tempo-
rary tax changes are smaller than those from permanent ones, but
neither provides much guidance about the magnitude of this differ-
ence. This paper offers new empirical estimates of this difference and
finds it to be quite substantial.
The analysis is based on an amendment of the standard distributed
lag version of the PIH that distinguishes temporary taxes from other
income on the grounds that the latter is "more transitory." This
amendment, which is broadly consistent with rational expectations,
leads to a nonlinear consumption function.
Though the standard error is unavoidably large, the point estimate
suggests that a temporary tax change is treated as a 50-50 blend of a
normal income tax change and a pure windfall. Over a 1-year plan-
ning horizon, a temporary tax change is estimated to have only a little
more than half as much impact as a permanent tax change of equal
magnitude, and a rebate is estimated to have only about 38 percent as
much impact. The model tracks both the extraordinarily high savings
rate of 1975:2 and the extraordinarily low savings rates of late 1976
and early 1977 very well and attributes part of both phenomena to the
temporary tax measures of 1975—76. Finally, it is estimated that a48 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
permanent tax cut of about $9.5billion(in 1972 dollars) would have
had the same impact on aggregate demand over the first 4 quarters as
the $20 billion of 1975—76 tax cuts.
Appendix A
The Lifetime Budget Constraint
This Appendix demonstrates a result that, to my knowledge,isnot very well
known:thatthe long—run MPC corresponding to a consumj)tion function of
theform
=kA1+ (Al)
is unity for any value of k (greater than the real rate of interest) and fbr any
bs.
Proo/: Write equation (10) in the text as
[1 —(1+ r)LIA, = — (A2)
and write (A I) as
C, =k41+ b(L)},, (A3)
where L is the lag operator andb(L)=b0+ b1L + ...+ Applying the
operator I —(I+ r)I. to (A3) and using (A2) yields U —(1+ r —k)LIC, = {kL
+ [1 —(1+ r)L}h(L)}Y,, which can be written
C, =B(L)Y,. (A4)
where
B L —kL+ [I —(1+ r)L}b(L) A5 1--(l+r—k)L
( )
To obtain the lifetime spending generated by a $1.00 impulse in V,. we must
compute the discounted sum of coefficients:
MPC =
(1
(A6)
To simplify the notation, let 01 + r —k.Assuming that 0 < 1 (i.e., that k >
r), (A5) can be written:B(L) ={kL+ Ill —(I+ r)L]b(L)}(1 + OL + 02L2 + .. .
Thisis of the form B (L) =B0+ B1!. + B2L2 + with the following
coefficients:
B,, =
B,Oh,, + [h + k — (1 + r)bJ,
B2 = 02h,, + 6[h, + k — (1 + r)b01+ [h2 —(1+ r)biI,
B,,=O"b,,+ O"'[h,+k— (I+ r)b,,] + ...+rh,,— (I+ r)h,,_,],
B,,,= O"''b,, + O"[h, + k — (I + r)h,,] + ... + 0h0 — (1 + r)b_1]
— (1+ r)h,,,
B,,÷,+. =O'B,,,, .v= 1, 2TEMPORARY INCOME TAXES 49
Substitutionofall of these into(A6),andsome trulyhorrendous grinding,
cstal)liShesthat MPG = 1 regardless ofthe magnitudes ofk and theh, (as long
as k > 0). Q.E.D.
Abriefwordon the Interpretationof thesumof'the hin (Al)maybe in
order here. Should Y, rise permanently by $1.00—a statement that isbasically
meaningless if ihe autoregressive process assumed in the text (eq. [21) really
holds—the eventual change in C,would,by(A4), heB(I)= 0B,.According
to (A5), this suni is
B(1) = __________ = I+(
— 5' b). k—i k—r
Thuscontrols the size of the spending response to a hypothetical perma-
nent rise in income; it does not influence the lifetime MPG.
AppendixB
Details on the Estimating Equation
ThisAppendix derives and explains the eqtiation that was actually estimated.
I begin by repeating equation (14) of the text:
C,=k,, + k,r,V, + k2(W — A,) +
+a;(Y,_ +
—S,_)+ i{(l —X)X/+(1 —D)S_] +U1.
Forpurposes of reducingheteroscedasticity, the assumption was made that
the standarddeviation ofu, was proportionalto}',, so the whole equation was
dividedthroughby }', to get
APC, = + k,,', + k2(-L —+ k31
+w(z,_ —q,-j) +
{
— X)x +(l— D)_] + €,
where
z1Y1IY1 (note: z, =1 for all'),
x= X•IY,,
— S,_ st_i—
qi—j= s,_, — Xxi,
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To estimate (B 1). the assumption wasmadethat both w andfollow
third—degree polynomials in :
- it'; = (I + (i} + (1J2 + a:j, (B2)
[3 =b0+ b11 + bj2 + bt)3.
Theend-point constraints mentioned in the text (w,,÷1 = = 0) are thus
00 +(a + I )a + (a + 1 )2a+(a + 1 )a =0 (B3)
b0+ (a + 1)b + (a + 1)2h2 + (a + 1 )3bt =0.
Equations(B3) were usedto eliminate the parameters Oüand b11.The
adding-tipconstraintdiscussed(andrejected) in thetext was thus
— (a+ 1)] + a[j2— (a+ 1)2] + a3[j —(a+ J)3]},
(B4)
= — (a+ 1)] + b2j2 —(a+ 1)2] + b:t[ft —(a+ 1)]},
which wasused to eliminatetheparametera.
Finally,in estimating (B 1), €1wasassumed to follow a first-order autore-
gressic scheme, p€,J + e1, wheree iswhite noise. Estimation was by
nonlinearleastsquares. whichis equivalent to maximumlikelihoodif c1 is
normally distributed. 1he ftiiiction actually minimized was
— — kr, — k2(W,
At)
—k3+; — ii'(z,_—
—13i[(l — A)x — (I — D)siJ —
withall the above—mentioneddefinitions andparameterrestrictions substi—
tlIte(lin.
The estimating forms when regular income was further disaggregated were
derived in precisely analogous ways from equations (16) and (18).
Appendix C
Calculation of the Real After-Tax Interest Rate
The real after-tax interest rate is defined as ï,= i(l—r,)
—7T, wherei is the
nominal interest rate, r, is the marginal tax rate, and 7T,isthe expected rate of
inflation.
',TominaI interest rate.—Fourdifferent iiomiiial interest rates were tried: a
corporate bond rate, the 4—6 month commercial paper rate, the 3-month
Treasury bill rate, and a weighted average of rates received on various time
and savings accounts. While all four led to very similar results, the Treasury
bill rate gave the best fit and so was adopted.
Marginal tax rate. —The marginal tax rate was created from the average tax
rate in the following way. Let T(y) be the tax function facing an individualTEMPORARY INCOME TAXES 51
taxpayer, and let 1(y)bethe frequency distribution of income. Theonly
directly observable tax rate is the aggregate average rate, which is A =
[J1'(y)f(y)dyj/Ifyf(y)dy].
Now suppose the whole income distribution shifts to the right with no
change in its shape; that is, it shifts fromfly) toJly(I
—h)J,where h connotes a
"small" multiplicative shift. The average income is then Y(h) =f)jTy(l
—
/z)Id,so that, for small shifts (h nearzero),dY/dh =— Jy2f(y)1y.Similarly,
averagetax payments after the shiftareT(/i) = I T(y)JIy(l
—h)1d,so that
dT/dh =— 5yT(y)f'(y)dy. Theaggregate marginal taxrate,M,isthe ratio of
these: M fyT(y )f'(y )dy ]/fy2f(y )dj.
To evaluate these integrals and obtain a closed expression for MIA,I
adopted the following functional forms:
T(y)=ay5(h>l,a>0),
f(y)=ye (y>O).
With these assumptions, the two ratios of integrals work out to be A =
ay2/'/)F(b + 1), M = (ay3I2y2)U(b + 2), where f(n) isthe"gamma
Function,"namely, F(n + I) =nI'(n).Hence MIA =(b +1)/2, andusing a tax
elasticity of b = 1.6 gives M = (1.3)A.
The average tax rate was computed, quarter by quarter, by dividing the
sum of federal and state-local personal tax and nontax payments by personal
income excluding transfers (an approximation to the tax base). These are all
official national income accounts series.
Expected rate of inflation—Inflationary expectations were generated by a
model based on what has been called "economically rational" expectations.23
The idea is that agents, in informing themselves, begin with the data that are
cheapest per unit of informational content and then proceed to process more
costly data until the marginal cost and (expected) marginal benefits are
equated. In this particular application, I assumed that consumers base their
expectations of the inflation rate (P1) on its own past history and on the history
of the growth rate of the money supply (M,). Thus I estimated an equation
F,=a0+ +b,i1,_ + e,
onactual U.S. quarterly data, using the deflator for personal consumption
expenditures for P, and M2 for i'd,, and assumed that consumers used this
equation to generate expectations. In estimation, I used the Almon (1965) lag
technique with third-degree polynomials, no end-point constraints, and vari-
ous choices for] and!. The best results were obtained with] = II and! = 17,
namely24
= —.60 + + b1M,.1,R2=.73,D-W =1.98,
(.38) I 0
standard error = 1.42, mean of dependent variable = 3.35,
=.67 = .27.
(.10) (.09)
See Feige and Pearce (1976).
24 Standard errors are in parentheses. The D-W is the Durbin-Watson statistic. The
period of estimation was 1951:3—1977:4, the longest period possible given the need for
17 lagged values of Al.52 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
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